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Abstract Tax competition and tax exportation have contrary implications for the ef-
ficiency of capital taxation. We provide a simple condition for the dominance of either
force, which depends on the mobility of foreign investment. We use this condition to
evaluate the relative importance of both forces in the US and in the EU.
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1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate about the consequences of the increasing mobility of
capital for capital taxation. The standard argument is that when capital moves freely
across borders, jurisdictions have an incentive to compete with each other in order to
attract capital. This can lead to a “race to the bottom” and result in inefficiently low
capital taxation.1
1For a survey of the substantial literature on tax competition, see Wilson (1999). There is also growing
evidence for the existence of tax competition, see, for example, Brueckner and Saavedra (2001).
This paper has benefitted substantially from the comments of the editor, Jay Wilson, and three
anonymous referees.
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Recently, however, a counteracting force to tax competition has been emphasized.
It arises because capital mobility facilitates cross-ownership of factors. Governments,
maximizing the welfare of their residents, may then set higher source taxes on capital
because a part of the tax burden falls on foreigners and can thus be exported.2
This paper presents a simple condition that allows us to compare the incentives
for tax competition and tax exportation empirically. The condition shows that the
dominance of either motive depends on the mobility of foreign investment.3 Using
previous estimates of the tax elasticity of foreign direct investment (FDI), we apply
this condition to the US and the EU. The results suggest that the tax competition
motive may be dominant in the EU, while in the US tax exportation may be more
important.
2 Efficiency of capital taxation in an open economy
Consider a small economy with a representative household who is endowed with an
amount of capital k. There is a representative domestic firm which has an amount of
capital k0 installed. However, this capital stock may adjust in response to changes in
taxation. We denote the new capital stock (that is, after a potential tax change) with
k and the corresponding output level with f (k). Foreigners own a share μK of the
domestic firm’s capital stock and a share μF of the country’s fixed factor.4 The world
interest rate is r .
In order to finance a public good, the government can raise a tax τ on the firm’s
capital. No other tax instruments are available.5 Denoting public good spending
with g, we thus have
g = τk (1)
The economy is initially in an equilibrium, in the sense that the domestic after-
tax return on capital equals the world interest rate: f ′ − τ = r . Consider now a tax
increase by the government. This reduces the domestic after-tax return on capital.
2Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) and Lee (1997) have shown that foreign ownership of profits and/or capital
may lead to excessive taxation. In a tax competition model calibrated to the US and to European regions,
Sørensen (2004) shows that foreign ownership has important implications for capital taxation. Empirical
evidence for the tax exportation motive is provided in Wagner and Eijffinger (2004) for the US and in
Huizinga and Nicodème (2008) for the EU.
3Huizinga and Nielsen (2002) also obtain a dominance condition for the tax elasticity of capital which is
implied by full capital mobility. By contrast, in our condition, the tax elasticity is a parameter. Further-
more, we apply our model to the US and the EU. Wagner and Eijffinger (2004) study both motives under
full financial integration and find that tax exportation incentives can lead to substantial taxes on capital.
However, the approach does not allow taxation efficiency to be evaluated.
4Thus, we also allow for a tax exportation motive to arise from cross-ownership of the fixed factor. Relat-
edly, it has been shown that optimal taxation is affected when government services are enjoyed by non-
residents (Arnott and Grieson 1981) and, in the context of income redistribution when there are foreign
immigrants that do not vote domestically (Leite-Monteiro 1997).
5The implications of tax exportation for the choice of tax instruments have been recently explored (e.g.,
Noiset 2003 and Braid 2005).
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Capital will then move abroad and we have k < k0. There are proportional costs γ of
shifting capital abroad, which are given by
γ (k) = γ0 k0 − k
k0
(2)
with γ0 > 0. Note that the costs increase when k falls. This implies that when more
capital is shifted abroad, the (proportional) costs rise. This can be interpreted as the
result of capital being heterogeneous and the more mobile parts of capital being
shifted abroad first. Note also that the proportional costs of shifting an infinitesimal
amount of capital abroad are zero.
The domestic household’s consumption c comes from the following sources. First,
he obtains his share in the return on the country’s fixed factor, (1−μF)(f −f ′(k)k).6
Second, he obtains his share in the return on capital that is held domestically after
capital relocation, (1 −μK)(f ′(k)− τ)k. Third, he obtains a return on capital shifted
abroad. His share in the amount of capital moved abroad is (1 − μK)(k0 − k) and
the rate of return on this is the world interest rate r minus the capital relocation
costs γ . Thus, this return is given by (1 − μK)(r − γ )(k0 − k). Fourth, he obtains
the return on capital that was already held abroad at the beginning of the period,
r(k − (1 − μK)k0). Return equalization requires that the return on domestic capital
has to equal the return of capital shifted abroad: f ′ − τ = r − γ . Using this, we can
summarize the household’s consumption as
c = (1 − μ)(f − f ′k) + rk − (1 − μK)γ k0 (3)
It thus consists of the household’s claim to domestic profits, (1 − μ)(f − f ′k), the
world return on his total capital stock, rk, minus a return loss on capital that was
installed domestically, (1 − μK)γ k0.
Now consider a reduction in taxes. After-tax returns increase as a result and cap-
ital will move into the country and we have k > k0. Denote the proportional costs
of moving capital into the country by γ˜ > 0. Return equalization requires then that
f ′ − τ − γ˜ = r , that is, the after-tax return on domestic capital net of relocation costs
equals the world interest rate. Analogous to (3), we can derive household’s consump-
tion as
c = (1 − μ)(f − f ′k) + rk + (1 − μK)γ˜ k0 (4)
We can see that the household now earns an excess return f ′ − τ − r = γ˜ > 0 on
domestically installed capital. Note that for γ˜ = −γ , consumption is identical to (3).
Moreover, also the two return equalization conditions are then the same. Hence, if we
set γ := −γ˜ < 0 when k > k0, we can use (3) and the corresponding return equaliza-
tion condition for both tax increases and decreases. Note also that γ in (2) is already
defined such that γ < 0 when k > k0.
6We could also allow the household to have claims to a foreign fixed factor. However, this would not
modify our analysis, since due to the small country assumption domestic taxation will not affect rents in
the rest of the world.
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The government’s optimization problem can be stated as maximizing the repre-
sentative household’s utility, consisting of the sum of the utility from private and
public consumption u(c) + v(g), subject to (1) and (3). In a closed economy, the
only effect of capital taxation is an increase in public consumption at the expense of
private consumption. Hence, issues of inefficient taxation and inefficient public good
provision do not arise. However, in an open economy, the optimal taxation problem
changes. First, an increase in the tax rate lowers leads to capital being shifted abroad
(k′(τ ) < 0). This erodes the tax base and reduces government’s incentives to tax (tax
competition motive). Second, the presence of foreign ownership (μK,μF > 0) lowers
the domestic incidence of taxation. This increases the government’s incentives to tax
(tax exportation motive).7
We assume for our analysis that production is Cobb–Douglas with f (l, k) =
lαk1−α , where l is the fixed factor. Proposition 1 states then that the tax competi-
tion motive dominates over the tax exportation motive (i.e., capital taxation and pub-
lic good provision are inefficiently low)8 if the tax elasticity of capital exceeds the
degree of foreign ownership of capital adjusted for a factor 1 + φ.
Proposition 1 There is under provision of the public good if and only if
|ε| > μK
1 + φ (5)
where ε = (k′(τ )/k)τ is the tax elasticity of capital and
φ := (μK − μF)α r + τ
τ
(6)
Proof The government’s FOC is u′(c)c′(τ ) + v′(g)g′(τ ) = 0. Hence, there is under
provision of the public good (i.e., v′(g)/u′(c) > 1) if and only if −c′(τ )/g′(τ ) > 1.
From (1), we have g′(τ ) = k + τk′(τ ). We write k′ as shorthand for k′(τ ) in the fol-
lowing. From (3), we get that c′(τ ) = (1 − μF)(f ′(k)k′ − f ′′(k)kk′ − f ′(k)k′) −
(1 − μK)γ ′(k)k′k0, which simplifies to c′(τ ) = −(1 − μF)f ′′(k)kk′ − (1 − μK)
γ ′(k)k′k0. We next derive an expression for γ ′(k). We know that return equaliza-
tion requires r − γ = f ′ − τ whenever there is a tax change. Totally differentiating
with respect to τ gives −γ ′(k)k′ = f ′′k′ − 1. Using f ′′(k) = −α(1 − α)lαk−α−1 =
−αf ′(k)/k and the equilibrium condition f ′(k) − τ = r we get after rearranging
γ0 = τ|ε| − α(r + τ). Thus, we have γ ′(k) = (− τ|ε| + α(r + τ)) 1k0 . Inserting into
7The motive for taxation arises here from foreign ownership of domestic factors. Lee (2003) has shown
that a government may also raise taxes on capital when domestic residents own immobile factors in other
countries. This is because the subsequent outflow of capital may increase the return on immobile factors
abroad, thus benefiting also domestic residents. This channel is not operative here because the small open
economy takes returns earned abroad as given.
8We focus on the dominance of the tax competition motive because a dominance of tax exportation does
not necessarily imply inefficiencies as governments may simply distribute any excess revenue to the house-
hold. Alternatively, governments may provide tax breaks in order to offset the excessive tax burden on
capital as in Wilson (1996).
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c′(τ ) gives c′(τ ) = −(1 − μF)f ′′(k)kk′ + (1 − μK)( τ|ε| − α(r + τ))k′. Again, us-
ing f ′′(k) = −αf ′(k)/k and f ′ − τ = r and furthermore that k = k0 in equilibrium,
we get c′(τ ) = (1 − μF)α(r + τ)k′ + (1 − μK)( τ|ε| − α(r + τ))k′, which can be re-
arranged to (μK −μF)α(r+τ)k′+(1−μK) τ|ε|k′. Substituting c′(τ ) and g′(τ ) into the
condition for under provision, −c′(τ )/g′(τ ) > 1, and rearranging, gives then (5). 
The intuition for why the condition depends on the tax elasticity |ε| and the for-
eign ownership of capital μK is straightforward. A higher tax elasticity implies larger
capital outflows following a tax increase, and thus strengthens the tax competition
motive. A higher foreign ownership of capital reduces the domestic incidence of the
capital tax when capital is not fully mobile, and increases the tax exportation motive.
The term φ = (μK − μF)α(r/τ + 1) arises because a capital outflow raises the
productivity of the remaining capital. This increases the pretax return on capital at
the costs of a lower return for the fixed factor. If the foreign ownership shares of
capital and the fixed factor are identical (μK = μF), this effect cancels out. φ is then
zero and the dominance condition becomes |ε| > μK. If the foreign ownership share
for capital is larger, the domestic household loses more in terms of return on the
fixed factor then he gains through a higher pretax return on domestic capital. Capital
outflows are then relatively more costly for the country. This makes taxation less
attractive, and hence φ > 0. Vice versa, if foreign ownership of capital is lower than
foreign ownership of the fixed factor, taxation becomes more attractive and we have
φ < 0.
Proposition 1 relates to public good under provision in the small economy. How-
ever, the result can easily be extended to the rest of the world. Suppose that the world
consists of many small countries (each of them being identical to our small open
economy). Suppose also that the world capital stock is fixed. Then world welfare is
solely determined by the efficiency of public good provision. When condition (5) is
in place, each country individually under provides the public good. Hence, there is
also under provision of the public good on the world level, that is, countries would
benefit from a coordinated rise in taxes.
2.1 An empirical test
In order to obtain an empirical test of (5), we assume that foreign ownership arises
from FDI only (and hence there is no portfolio investment). The motivation is first
that FDI is more closely related to the allocation of real capital, and thus to k in
our model. Second, focusing on FDI has the advantage that we can make use of the
extensive empirical literature on the mobility of FDI.
Denote the total amount of (inward) FDI in the economy by FDI and the tax elas-
ticity of (inward) FDI by εFDI = (FDI′(τ )/FDI)τ . The degree of foreign ownership of
capital is hence μK = FDI/k. Consider a small reduction in the tax τ . This increases
the domestic after-tax return on capital and causes an capital inflow. We assume that
this capital inflow arises from a change in inward FDI only. The motivation is that
the capital that is already installed is relatively fixed. Thus, the country may not re-
duce its outward FDI stock following a tax increase, as relocating the capital that is
installed abroad may be too costly.
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Hence, we have ε = (k′(τ )/k)τ = (FDI′(τ )/k)τ = εFDIμK. Condition (5), there-
fore, simplifies to
|εFDI| > 11 + φ (7)
Equation (7) shows that the tax competition motive will dominate only according to
the tax elasticity of FDI, εFDI, and the adjustment factor, φ.
Note, however, that μK enters (7) indirectly through its impact on |εFDI|. To see
this, consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that there exist two small
economies that have a different μK but are identical with respect to the model’s other
parameters. For example, one economy may simply have a larger foreign ownership
share for historical reasons. As by assumption, both economies have the same tax
elasticity of capital |ε|, a reduction in the capital tax rate would cause the same capital
inflow (in absolute terms) in both economies. However, expressed as a percentage of
total FDI, the inflow is smaller in the economy with the higher μK, and hence |εFDI|
is smaller for this economy. Therefore, |εFDI| summarizes both tax competition and
tax exportation effects.9
We first parameterize the factor φ = (μK −μF)α r+ττ . We interpret the fixed factor
as labor, as is commonly done in macroeconomic calibrations. Most studies calibrate
α to the labor income share (see, e.g., Gomme and Rupert 2008). For the US, this
share is around 0.7, and hence we set α = 0.7. The degree of foreign ownership of
capital, μK, is set to 7% to match the ratio of inward FDI to the capital stock in
the US. The degree of foreign ownership of labor, μF, is set to 0.1%, which is the
ratio of labor income of foreigners to total labor income in the US.10 This is likely to
understate foreign ownership of fixed factors, as the other main fixed factor (land) has
a higher foreign ownership. However, it turns out that our results are not particularly
sensitive to sensible variations in the foreign ownership parameters (and also the
income share parameter α).
The results are, however, more sensitive to the ratio of the pretax return on capital
and the capital tax rate, r+τ
τ
. There is also more disagreement on this value. For
the pretax return, typical values are between 7% and 13% (e.g., Gomme and Rupert
2008). Calibrations for the tax rate on capital income also range widely, from 25%
to values up to 70% (such high rates are needed in order to calibrate empirically
reasonable growth rates).11 Using these parameter ranges, we obtain a range for φ of
0.15 < φ < 0.32 or
0.76 <
1
1 + φ < 0.87 (8)
9Condition (7) may have to be modified if tax increases are considered. This is because the elasticity of
outward FDI will then determine the elasticity of the capital stock. However, at least for the US, this issue
is of less importance because estimated inward and outward FDI elasticities are similar (see Hines 1999).
10Compensation of foreign workers in the US was 2.4 bln in the last quarter of 2006 and GDP was about
3400 bln. Using the labor income share of α = 0.7, this gives a foreign labor income share of about
2.4/(3400 · 0.7) = 0.1%.
11These income tax rates have to be transferred into capital tax rates. For example, for a pretax return of
7% and a capital income tax rate of 25%, we obtain a capital tax rate of 7% · 25% = 1.75%.
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Hines (1999) reports a consensus tax elasticity of −0.6 for FDI in the US. Sim-
ilarly, in a survey of elasticity estimates consisting largely of studies of the US, de
Mooij and Ederveen (2003) find a mean elasticity of FDI of −0.7.12 Thus, condition
(7) is (just) violated, suggesting that public goods may be provided efficiently in the
US.
Recent studies for the European Union have found higher elasticities. Gorter and
Parikh (2000), Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005), and Stöwhase (2008) report elasticities
between −1.2 and −1.5.13 Condition (7) is then fulfilled, suggesting that the tax
competition effect may be dominating in the EU, and hence capital taxes may be
inefficiently low.14
2.2 Qualifications
First of all, it should be mentioned that there is still substantial uncertainty about
the true magnitude of FDI elasticities (for a survey of FDI elasticities, see de Mooij
and Ederveen 2003). This is for a variety of reasons, such as issues arising from
the correct measurement of FDI and the relevant tax rates. In particular, it has been
mentioned that the estimated FDI elasticities may overstate the true elasticities (e.g.,
Hines 1999, p. 309). One reason why this may be the case is that foreign investors
habitually reinvest their earnings. As reinvested earnings appear as FDI, FDI and
after-tax rates of return become positively correlated.
Our analysis has ignored foreign portfolio investment (FPI). This is basically be-
cause portfolio investment consists to a substantial part of financial investment and
is therefore less related to the real capital stock in the economy to which our model
relates.15 There is also a lack of empirical studies in the taxation literature that ad-
dress the elasticity of portfolio investment and which we could use for our empirical
test. In the following, we nevertheless want to clarify the potential role of portfolio
investment in our setup.
Assume now that the foreign capital stock, μKk, consists of direct investment and
(real) portfolio investment, i.e., μKk = FDI + FPI. Denote the tax elasticity of FPI
by εFPI = (FPI′(τ )/FPI)τ and the relative shares of direct investment and portfolio
investment by β and 1 − β , respectively. It follows that the tax elasticity of capital ε
is
ε = (k′(τ )/k)τ = ((FDI′(τ ) + FPI′(τ ))/k)τ = (εFDIFDI + εFPIFPI)/k
= μK(βεFDI + (1 − β)εFPI)
12Most studies report tax rate elasticities (semielasticities), which can be transformed into elasticities by
multiplying with the capital tax rate. We assume a rate of 30% for this calculation.
13Büttner (2002) reports a somewhat lower estimate between −0.5 and −0.9.
14Note that under provision of public goods in the EU relative to the US does not imply lower taxation in
the EU since preferences for public consumption may be larger in the EU.
15Suppose, for example, that the government (unexpectedly) raises the capital tax rate. This reduces the
price of domestic equity and thus the value of FPI. The capital stock of domestic firm, however, may be
unchanged.
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Inserting into (5) gives
β|εFDI| + (1 − β)|εFPI| > 11 + φ (9)
Hence, in the presence of portfolio investment, the relevant elasticity is the weighted
average of the FDI and FPI elasticities, where weights are given by their relative
shares in total foreign investment. For the US and for many other industrialized coun-
tries, FDI and FPI are of a similar magnitude (e.g., Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2001,
suggesting that this would be roughly the unweighted average of both elasticities.
Thus, our results will only be biased if the FPI elasticity (for real capital) differs from
the FDI elasticity.
We have also presumed that tax reductions affect the domestic capital stock only
through an increase in inward FDI but not through a reduction in outward FDI. This
is obviously an extreme assumption. Take the other extreme and assume that outward
FDI is equally sensitive to (domestic) tax reductions as inward FDI. Then the capi-
tal elasticity of taxation would effectively double. As a result, the left-hand side of
condition (7) (which represents the capital elasticity) becomes twice as large. This
would strengthen the tax competition motive and suggest that an efficient provision
of public goods may also be a problem for the US.
For our analysis, we have interpreted the fixed factor as labor and have assumed
that labor is immobile. However, labor becomes increasingly mobile across borders.
When labor is mobile but governments still take their citizens into account when
they reside abroad (as, for example, in Leite-Monteiro 1997), the tax competition
motive may be weakened. This is because a capital outflow following a tax increase
becomes then less costly for the country, since the resulting reduction in the labor
productivity hurts the country less since its citizens can move abroad. A further reason
why tax competition may become less attractive due to labor mobility is that the
higher perceived benefits it creates for a country (in terms of higher wages and/or
social transfers) tend to increase immigration. Since domestic residents then have to
share the benefits with the immigrants, they may vote against lower taxes (Kessler,
Lülfesmann, Myers 2002).
Another simplification we have made is that the fixed factor consists only of labor.
It is straightforward to extend the analysis to include other fixed factors. Suppose, for
example, that there are two fixed factors, l1 and l2, and that production is still Cobb–
Douglas: f (l1, l2, k) = lα11 lα22 k1−α1−α2 . Define with r = l2/l1 the ratio of the fixed
factors. We can then rewrite production as f = rα2 lα1+α21 k1−α1−α2 . The proportional
term rα2 can be ignored and for α := α1 + α2, we get f (l, k) = lαk1−α .
In order to compute α (which is needed for the computation of φ) in the presence
of more than one fixed factor, we can thus simply add the income shares of all fixed
factors. As before, the foreign ownership share of the fixed factor can be obtained by
dividing the fixed factor income that is attributable to foreigners by the total income of
the fixed factors, f − f ′(k)k. If one assumes that factors are remunerated according
to their marginal product, their income shares will be proportional to their α since
we have assumed Cobb–Douglas properties. The total foreign ownership share of the
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fixed factor is then
μF = α1μF1 + α2μF2
α1 + α2 (10)
i.e., the sum of the foreign ownership shares of the fixed factors weighted with their
respective income shares.
Typically, land is considered as the second fixed factor. Incorporating land creates
two offsetting effects on the tax exportation motive through its impact on φ (6). On
one hand, foreign ownership of land is likely to be higher than foreign ownership
of labor. Thus, μF increases and the total burden borne by the domestically owned
fixed factors following a capital outflow falls (φ decreases when μF increases). On
the other hand, also the total income share that is attributable to fixed factors, α,
rises. This has the effect of raising the share of the tax burden that is borne by fixed
factors. As the overall foreign ownership share of the fixed factors is likely to be still
lower than for capital, the domestic burden of a tax rise becomes higher (φ increases
when α increases and μF < μK). The implications for our empirical test, however,
are limited. This is because as already mentioned earlier, φ is not very sensitive to
variations in μF and α.
Another issue is that a substantial tax burden of corporations comes in the form
of property taxes, which tax capital and land income at the same rate (as modeled
in Wilson 1995, and Braid 1996). The tax exportation motive will be stronger for
a property tax than for a tax that is raised solely on capital. This is because it also
redistributes land income from foreigners to the domestic household. Thus, compared
to a capital tax, under provision of public goods is less likely when property taxes are
used.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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